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(literally group actions), which entered into force 1 October, 2008. The legislative 
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early 1990s and this was - depending on the criteria of counting - the fourth try. Some 
fifteen years ago the idea of class actions was something new in Europe. Time passes 
quickly however, and the new Finnish law cannot be described as radical by any meaning 
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enacted new laws to make class action litigation possible. This article analyses the 
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1. Introduction
Finnish Parliament accepted in February 2007 a new law on class actions (literally 
”group actions”), which entered into force January 1, 2008.
1 The legislative process was 
particularly slow. Finland has been preparing a law on class actions since the early 1990s 
and this was – depending on the criteria of counting – the fourth try. 
Some fifteen years ago the idea of class actions was something new in Europe. Time 
passes quickly however, and the new Finnish law cannot be described as ”radical” by any 
meaning of the word. Many European countries, as described in other articles in this 
volume
2, have changed their existing procedural codes and enacted new laws to make 
1 Ryhmäkannelaki, 13.2.2007. The law is based on government’s proposal nr. 154/2006. 
2 This chapter is a contribution to the book Class Actions for Europe: Law and Economics Perspectives, 
edited by Backhaus, J. G., Cassone, A. and Ramello, G.B. (2011 forthcoming), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
–Northampton.
1class action litigation possible. 
The new Finnish class action law differs from the mainstream in fundamentally limiting 
its scope of application. Although the law is titled as being a general law on class actions, 
it only applies to consumer cases where the government-funded Consumer Ombudsman 
is acting as the lead counsel. This was not the case in the beginning. Years ago, the first 
law proposals had much broader scope of application but as the lobbying between 
potential defendants (the industry) and plaintiffs (consumer agencies etc.) became 
polarized, it became evident that there can be either a major compromise or no law at all. 
Indeed, the objectives and contents of the law proposals changed many times during the 
years
This article analyses the Finnish lawmaking process from comparative and economic 
policy viewpoints. First, the article discusses how did the Finnish legislative process end 
up with a certain outcome. It is argued that neither well-founded economic nor empirical 
arguments had any relevant role. Instead, partisan claims on class action cases in the 
United States and their potential implications to companies were used as a strong 
argument to restrict the law’s scope of application. The official preparatory documents 
did not present any study on experiences from the United States. There was non-partisan 
empirical evidence of the use of class actions only from Sweden. 
Second, this article compares the claims presented in the Finnish lawmaking process to 
studies and legislative work made in other countries. Can one really claim, as was done 
during the legislative process in Finland, that other countries have made serious mistakes 
when they have not restricted the scope of application in class actions? Would a law on 
class actions also open doors to the misuse of the system through frivolous suits? Are 
class actions a totally foreign tool to continental European legal systems? The article 
concludes that these claims are mainly based on partisan opinions, not on well-founded 
studies. The examples of other Nordic countries show that there is nothing uncommon in 
implementing class actions in a Northern European legal system. Misuse of class actions 
is not likely due to e.g. fundamental differences in the substance of accident law and the 
rules regarding the indemnification of legal costs in litigation.
Third, this article argues that the main reason why the Finnish class action law “failed” 
was the dynamics of the legislative process. The process may not aim to the best possible 
outcome for the society as a whole. In accordance with the theory of public choice, the 
result is often a compromise between conflicting interests. The idea of reaching a 
consensus in preparatory work before a law is submitted to the parliament means that if 
well-organized interest groups are able to form a strong opposition, the law may never 
enter the parliament no matter of the substantial arguments.
3  The result is that an 
unknown number of cases are not litigated at all in Finland because the scope of 
application of the law is restricted. Regulatory authorities have no resources to provide as 
extensive preventive threat as would a complementary private mechanism. 
3 On the theory of public choice and interest groups see e.g. Mercuro and Medema (2006, pp. 191-195).
22. A History of Finland’s Class Action Law 
2.1 Minimalist Approach
According to the first paragraph of the Finnish law on class actions, the law can be 
applied only in civil litigation in cases between consumers and businesses. In addition, 
Consumer Ombudsman is the only party that can bring in and litigate cases on behalf of 
consumers.
4 The first paragraph then further clarifies that the law is not applicable in 
securities cases (stock owners are not consumers).
5  If a case is filed, the Consumer 
Ombudsman must inform all the individuals that can be considered to be in the relevant 
class. An individual must then submit a written acceptance to the Consumer Ombudsman 
that he wants to be member in the suing class. This follows the so-called  opt-in 
procedure. 
In short, the Finnish law on class actions introduces at least three major limitations into 
its scope of application:
o The case must be between consumers and businesses; particularly securities cases 
are not allowed, however.
o The only party that can litigate on behalf of consumers is the Consumer 
Ombudsman.
o Consumers must submit written acceptances to the Consumer Ombudsman if they 
want to be members in the suing class (opt-in).
All these limitations support a  compensatory  rather than preventive objective. The 
limitations make sense if the law is to defend first and foremost the subjective interests of 
individuals. The limitations make the law an unsuitable tool for social engineering 
through private means. In other words, Finland still trusts on  regulation  rather than 
private enforcement. It is assumed that the Finnish state and its various governmental 
agencies keep on monitoring corporate behavior. Next, it is considered how and why did 
the Finnish legislative process end up with this outcome.
2.2 Early Law Proposals with Broader Approach Failed
Finland and Sweden were the first Nordic countries to start officially prepare class action 
legislation in the early 1990s.
6 The first Finnish preliminary investigation was published 
in 1992 concluding essentially that it was possible to introduce class actions in Finland 
following the United States  model.
7  The Ministry of Justice set up a follow-up 
preparatory group, which published in 1995 a draft law proposal that argued for a new 
4 In practice, the Ombudsman can delegate representation and according to the law even hire outside 
counsel as an advisor. 
5 It is unclear whether various kinds of modern investment instruments could be defined as securities based 
on the law’s definition.
6 One can say the initiative came from Sweden. See section 4 below.
7 Wihuri (1992).
3class action law with a broad scope of application.
8  The group consisted of a law 
professor, civil servants, members from the judiciary and the Consumer Ombudsman – 
but notably none from the industry and neither was any industry representative heard in 
the preparatory work. The group’s proposal would have made it possible to initiate class 
action on any actionable claim under Finnish law. Anyone could have been the lead 
plaintiff with his chosen attorney. Class membership would have been based on the opt-
out principle. Because of increasing critique from the industry representatives, the first 
draft never proceeded as a formal law proposal in the parliament. Instead, a new working 
group – now including industry representatives – published a new draft proposal in 1997 
with some limitations in the scope of application.
9 Due to intense lobbying from the 
industry, the limited proposal did not proceed any further either. 
Meanwhile Sweden adopted a law on class action that entered into force in 2003. Save 
for the opt-in principle, the Swedish law did not have any relevant restrictions in its scope 
of application. Norway and Denmark, which were not that active in the 1990s, followed 
quickly with their own law proposals based on the Swedish example.
10 
Finland continued the work as well. The Ministry of Justice set up the next governmental 
working group in 2004, which published its preliminary findings in 2005.
11 In addition to 
civil servants and members from the judiciary, two members came from the industry, two 
represented consumer protection interests, one environmental protection, one came from 
a labor union, and one was an attorney. Despite opposing comments by the industry 
representatives, the work finally resulted in a formal law proposal in the next year.
12 The 
2005 working group did not take a certain position for example following the United 
States, Sweden, or other Nordic countries for that matter, but continued the work from 
where the previous groups in the 1990s had left it. Partly to mitigate industry worries, the 
group introduced possibilities to introduce an even further limited approach to class 
actions. From now one, it was a question about a minimalist class action law or no class 
actions at all.
2.3 The Art of Identifying Needs a Priori
The first main problem with the group’s document was that it did not empirically identify 
the needs for class actions in the first place. The document did not present any data on 
the types of class actions in the United States or other countries, where the system had 
been in active use for decades. The only empirical data was from Sweden, where class 
actions were just introduced. Necessarily, the data set was far from representative 
although one must admit it was indicative. During the first three years there had been 
8 Anonymous (1995). Ehdotus ryhmäkannelaiksi. Työryhmän mietintö. Oikeusministeriön 
lainvalmisteluosaston julkaisu 1/1995. (In Finnish, “Proposal for a law on class actions.”)
9 Anonymous, (1997). According to this proposal, private organizations such as workers unions could have 
not been claimants, class membership would have been based on opt-in principle, and it would have not 
been possible to sue for specified issues such as contract breach.
10 See section 4 below.
11 Anonymous (2005). 
12 The follow-up draft law was Anonymous (2006a), which was then forwarded to the parliament with 
minor modifications as Government’s law proposal 154/2006.
4only one case lead by the Swedish Consumer Ombudsman among a total of six cases. 
None of them dealt with environmental issues.
13 For some unknown reasons, the group 
did not comment on that in any way or recognize a need to do a more comprehensive 
survey. Only consumer and environmental cases were discussed further as possible 
application areas. 
The actual arguments used to limit the law’s scope were rather formal and theoretical. 
Consumer protection was suggested to be the main application area because:
14
o There are potentially an increasing number of consumer groups with similar small 
claims.
o Preventive function is important in the continuously evolving field of consumer 
protection.
o The scope of application in consumer protection law is clearly limited.
o There is Consumer Ombudsman, agencies, and voluntary dispute resolution 
mechanisms, which means that litigation becomes actual only after other conflict 
resolution possibilities have failed.
The draft law proposal further motivated consumer protection with speculative statements 
describing the rise of “global consumer society”. In addition, there was a reference to an 
earlier preparatory document from 1990s stating: “from the case examples [discussed in 
the document] it is possible to conclude that class actions would be first and foremost 
actual in [selected consumer protection issues]”. The referred cases did not however 
represent any statistically meaningful set – the areas of law were selected first before the 
actual cases were searched for.
15 Environmental cases were also argued for although the 
motivations were briefer. Because the group had adopted a sector-focused approach to 
class actions, other areas of law did not receive any arguments for or against.
16 
Ministry of Justice received over 40 comments on the draft law.
17 The only parties that 
argued for no limits in the scope of application were three professors of procedural law 
and a consumer interest group. Professors referred to formal reasons and the examples of 
other Nordic countries. The consumer group agreed. Two labor unions also advocated to 
extent the law’s scope to employment cases.
18 Most of the commentators simply agreed 
with the chosen limitation on consumer cases, but were more cautious on environmental 
issues for both formal and substantial reasons. Industry representatives continued to be 
fundamentally against the idea of class actions in the first place. Based on the feedback 
the Ministry of Justice decided to drop environmental  issues from the scope of 
13 The first Swedish cases include e.g. securities and civil rights. See section 4 below.
14 Anonymous, (2005, pp. 54-55).
15 Anonymous, (2006a, p. 39), which referred to the law proposal from 1997. The selection of the cases in 
the 1997 proposal was “exemplary” and it was specifically stated that “no comprehensive study of case law 
has been done.” Anonymous (1997, p. 17).
16 Interestingly, the 1992 investigation had some data from the United States (referred from Swedish 
studies) that indicated most the class action cases there were about civil rights. See Wihuri (1992).
17 Anonymous, (2006b ). 
18 Anonymous, (2006b, p. 11).
5application before the law was formally proposed in the parliament.
19 The law’s scope of 
application did not change in the parliamentary process.
2.4 The Art of Identifying Economic Effects a Priori 
Another major problem with the 2005 group’s document was that it started with a 
statement that they did not have at their disposal any economic analysis of the effects of 
class actions.
20 This comment was perhaps more telling than any other. Namely it did not 
restrict the group to document numerous claims about the negative economic effects of 
class actions in the United States. The only documented source on the effects of class 
action in the United States was an oral testimony and written brief from Nokia.
21 
According to an article in a Finnish economic magazine:
22 
“The fight against class action legislation had its peak when Nokia director Rick 
Stimson gave his testimony to the working group in the Ministry of Justice. The 
American lawyer told how Finland should write its law. In the final minutes of his 
presentation he repeated six times that there are no reasons or needs to change the 
current practice… Stimson told to the working group several examples of the 
misuse of class actions in the United States. According to him, the ones benefiting 
from the system are attorneys, who share the millions of dollars in attorney fees. 
Claimants have received just little amounts of money or other benefits.”
It is difficult to assess the overall impact of the Nokia brief to the outcome of the 
legislative process. The brief is, however, interesting reading since it collects almost all 
negative claims about class actions presented in the United States. According to the brief:
23
“The United States Chamber of Commerce estimates that business in the US 
spend tens of millions of dollars each year defending against frivolous lawsuits 
and that the total cost of the US tort system (civil claims) to US businesses is 
more than $129 billion USD per year. While there has been no allocation of that 
to class action litigation, class action litigation is the most costly to defend and the 
most costly to settle, even when no product defect or injury has occurred or been 
proven.”
In other words, the strategy was to blur any distinction between procedural law and 
substantial accident law as if a procedural class action instrument in Finland would also 
introduce American substantive law. Further, according to the Nokia brief, the argument 
that… :
24
19 Government’s proposal nr. 154/2006.
20 Anonymous, (2005, p. xx).
21 The document titled “The US Class Action” is on file with the author. It is unpublished but public.
22 Puustinen (2007). 
23 Document titled “The US Class Action” is on file with the author. It is unpublished but public.
24 Nokia’s brief.
6“…class action litigation is required to regulate business practices, presumes that 
a) there are current deficiencies in corporate behaviour that need to be regulated; 
b) alternative mechanisms to control behaviour do not function or exist; c) class 
actions are an effective deterrent; and 4) there is some cost benefit relationship 
between class action litigation and social benefit. Those four arguments do not 
survive close examination when applied to Finland or the European community.”
The brief went to argue that there was high ethics in the industry (low corruption rate), 
much regulation and government control already in place, and good access to justice for 
individuals because of the legal cost indemnification principle. Other industry groups 
followed up with vague references to “legends” from the United States and argued that 
Finland would lose foreign investments if unlimited class actions would be possible. In 
essence, the industry argumentation did not differ from the 1990s at all.
The Ministry of Justice answered in the draft law noting that the claims of negative 
economic effects are necessarily theoretic. There were no indications that the Swedish 
law on class actions would have had any effect on investments into Sweden. No new 
insurance products had been introduced on the market, nor had insurance premiums risen. 
They had no information that multinational Finnish companies would have avoided 
Swedish or even American markets just because of class actions. They also noted that 
there was no real possibility for frivolous suits because the only party having power to 
initiate a suit was Consumer Ombudsman.
25 Although these arguments may sound like a 
general defense of class actions, they were modestly aimed at only defending the strictly 
limited draft proposal and make it possible to have at least some kind of law enacted. 
As noted, the draft law received more than 40 comments. Maybe the most interesting 
regarding economic effects was the one from the Government’s Institute for Economic 
Research.
26  Although short and informal, this was the only one from a research 
organization and the only one – save for some partisan industry comments – that focused 
on the economic effects. The Institute first noted correctly that most of the claims for and 
against certain economic effects of class actions were based on theoretical conclusions 
or pure guessing. Unfortunately, the comment itself also fell to the same speculation 
fallacy it first criticized. The comment did not provide any empirical or economic 
evidence, or even references, on class actions. It plainly went on to criticize the idea of 
legal entrepreneurship with the following statement:
“If possible cases would be about compensating small claims, it is unclear what 
the benefits of class action would be. In this case the most important effect on 
companies would be the increase of law firm turnovers.” 
Further, the comment trashed specifically environmental class actions, just because…:
“…It   is   easy   to   think   of   cases,   where   well-resourced   organizations   (e.g. 
25 Anonymous, (2006b, pp. 74-78).
26 Document titled “Lausunto ryhmäkannetyöryhmän mietinnössä suoritetusta yritysvaikutusten 
arvioinnista.” is on file with the author.
7Greenpeace) could with weak grounds litigate against Finnish forest and energy 
companies. Suits would not necessary be accepted, but they would tie large 
companies   to   lengthy   trials   and   could   at   the   same   time   harm   smaller 
subcontractors of these large companies.”
The formal law proposal submitted to the parliament did not comment further on the 
Institute’s claims although, as noted, environmental issues were left out of the its scope.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the idea of frivolous suits is the procedural 
rule that the losing party is subject to the legal costs of the winning party. For 
example if the Finnish Consumer Ombudsman loses a case where it has defended 
an individual consumer against a major industrial firm, it is not uncommon that a 
Finnish district court reimburses more than 100 000 euros of defendant’s legal 
fees from the Ombudsman. Under these circumstances it is understandable that 
there will be no case unless the victory is almost sure.
27
3. Other Nordic Countries: Adopting the American Model with Adjustments
Discussion on class actions in Nordic countries can be said to have started seriously when 
Swedish law professor Per Henrik Lindblom publish a major book on the topic in 1989.
28 
He carefully presented and rebutted numerous myths about class actions in the United 
States and finally concluded: “No decisive barriers to a Swedish adoption appear to be at 
hand.”
29 The first policy meeting for all Nordic countries was arranged soon afterwards. 
According to the proceedings, “There appeared to be practically full agreement that the 
group action deserves special attention in the ongoing de lege ferenda discussion.”
30 
Sweden then went on to commission a working group to prepare an extensive three-
volume legislative pre-investigation.
31 The working group was again lead by professor 
Lindblom with members from the judiciary, government institutions, an attorney, a 
lawyer from a labor union, and even one from the industry who objected particular issues 
such as the idea of private class actions and the opt-out principle.
32 This was just the 
beginning compared to the industry critique following the investigation’s publication. 
The critique may have been even stronger than in Finland. Lindblom took the time to 
answer the industry claims and forcefully defended the proposal he had initiated. 
Lindblom’s conclusion was that the proposal had nothing to do with substantive law, 
27 Phone conversation with Consumer Agency’s lawyer Jari Suurla, June 25, 2007. The Consumer 
Ombudsman has secured to reserved only 20 000 euros for potential class actions in 2008. Thus, it is very 
likely there will be no class action cases in Finland in the near future. 
28 Per Lindblom (1989). The book has almost 800 pages.
29 Ibid. p. 729 (English summary)
30 The meeting focused on the possibility of class actions in consumer protection issues. Per Lindblon 
(1990, p. 222) (English summary) 
31 SOU 1994:151. Grupprättegång. Del A-C.
32 Ibid. Del B, pp. 685-689.
8which was the target of the critique.
33 After all the dust had settled, the investigation led 
eventually into a formal law proposal in 2001 with little details such as the opt-out 
principle omitted.
34 The law was accepted and came into force in the beginning of 2003.
35
Norway and Denmark followed the Swedish legislative work. Their proposals came after 
the Swedish law was already accepted. At this stage, the industry critique did not stop the 
proposals from becoming law quickly. Both Norwegian and Danish national laws are 
entering into force January 1, 2008.
36 
The content of these Nordic laws is rather identical and in many respects close to the 
American model. The scope of application is not limited to certain types of cases and 
standard rules on attorneys apply. The only major difference is that opt-in is mandatory in 
Sweden. In Norway and Denmark opt-in is the main principle as well, but opt-out can be 
applied when the individual claim is small enough and it is not likely that the claimants 
would bother to take the time to opt-in.
Table 1. A comparison of some key features of new class action laws in Finland, Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark. Finnish law is extremely restricted.
Sweden is the first Nordic country to have some data on class actions. There were total of 
six class actions initiated during the first three years. Only one of them was lead by the 
Consumer Ombudsman, others were private suits. As in the United States, case topics 
have   varied   from   clear   consumer   protection   issues   to   corporate   governance   and 
constitutional rights.
 37 The low number and topical variety of cases speaks for the fact 
that class actions complement the role of regulatory authorities. In this sense, one could 
33 See on overview, see Lindblom (1996, pp. 85-107), which starts with the following statement: “There is 
a strong, well-organized, well-funded and influential opposition to the proposal on class actions…” He 
identified the opposition to consist of a group of big companies (“storföretagsgruppen”) who had further 
hired attorneys and lobby organization to advance their cause. 
34 According to Blom (2006, p. 96), the reason why the proposal was idle for so many years was not the 
critique but rather the administrative burden initiated by Sweden’s EU membership.
35 Lag 2002:599 om grupprättegång. 
36 Norwegian law: Lov 2005-06-17 nr 90: Lov om mekling og rettergang i sivile tvister (tvisteloven). 
Kapittel 35. Gruppesøksmål. Danish law: Lov nr. 181 af 28. februar 2007 om ændring af retsplejeloven og 
forskellige andre love (Gruppesøgsmål m.v.). Kapitel 23 a. Gruppesøgsmål.
37 For statistics of different areas of class actions in the United States, see e.g. Deborah R. Hensler et al. 
(2000): Class Action Dilemmas. Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 
especially section 3 and Willging and Lee  (2007), with search term “Class action litigation”.
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Country Finland Sweden Norway Denmark






No limits No limits No limits
Opt-out N/A N/A Small claims Small claimsargue that class actions also minimize regulatory costs.
One can find examples on the limits of government regulation also in its strong 
areas such as consumer protection. One recent example is a case when recording 
companies offered so called copy-protected CDs to consumers. Sony’s particular 
copy protection system introduced a security vulnerability to the computers of 
thousands of consumers world-wide in 2005. Sony drew the CDs from the 
markets and settled a class action suit in the United States.
38 Meanwhile, hundreds 
of Finnish consumers protested openly against the problems of copy protections. 
After pressure from journalists, the Finnish Consumer Agency announced it 
would have a meeting with recording company representatives before it could 
make any statement of the case.
39 That statement never came.
Discussion on the principles of process law has differed somewhat from the United 
States. It is often argued that courts should decide individual lawsuits and not became 
arenas   for   social   policy.   Besides,   lawmakers   in   the   Nordic   countries   have   had 
traditionally an active and strong role. On the other hand there has been increasingly 
demands for direct democracy. Legislators and other government authorities have been 
criticized to be unable to react quickly enough to complex issues. It has been questioned 
where one needs third parties to enforce the rights of individuals that have been clearly 
defined in the parliamentary process. As one example, Finnish law professor Thomas 
Wilhelmsson has argued for class actions based on societal and economic reasons. He has 
presented that the functions of liability law should include regulatory, monitoring, 
service, and social security functions.
40 He argues that class actions can be used as a 
”micropolitical instrument” in the Nordic market economies to further these “modern” 
goals of liability law.
41  
4. Concluding Remarks: Why Did the Finnish Legislative Process Fail?
As this volume shows, it is evident that class actions are in Europe to stay. Their 
introduction, however, has not happened in a straightforward way. Many countries have 
adopted a very similar approach compared to the United States, but this has not been the 
case everywhere. The Finnish implementation is one example of a failed process.
42 
This article has presented that the main failures in the process were:
1. Lack of empirical data of the various needs for class actions. For some unknown 
38 Information about the settlement can be found here: http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp/
39 Kuivalainen (2005).
40 Wilhelmsson (2001, pp. 64-64).
41 Ibid, pp. 176-177.
42 As another similar example, Baumgartner (2007) criticizes how a class action law proposal in 
Switzerland was rejected with formal arguments without any empirical study on the various needs to have 
class actions. 
10reasons lawmakers focused only on consumer protection and environmental 
issues. They did not bother to survey empirical data from other countries but 
relied on theoretical speculations and submissions from selected interest groups. 
Comparative empirical data shows, however, that consumer protection and the 
environment are just two of the potential application areas for class actions. Issues 
such as constitutional rights could be considered fundamentally more important 
for the society as a whole. In the United States, these cases account for about 15% 
of all cases and even one the first Swedish cases dealt with constitutional issues. 
To compare, no document in the Finnish legislative process mentioned the need to 
discuss constitutional eights or even any need to consult such interest groups.
2. Lack of analysis of various economic effects of class actions. True, it is difficult to 
estimate the economic effects of class actions but this should not be a reason to 
skip the issue. Perhaps the easiest way to start such analysis is to survey published 
empirical studies from other countries. Necessarily, one must collect this material 
from other jurisdictions than Sweden. Obviously United States has been the 
leading “test market” for class actions and there is abundance of economic 
research material and empirical studies on the effects of class actions. Especially 
indicating in this regard is the final Finnish law proposal’s formal argument why 
American experiences were not surveyed in-depth: ”…the process law in common 
law legal systems is not directly comparable to the process laws and other 
legislation regarding legal process in Finland... likewise, substantial law is based 
on a different legal culture.” Also of note here is that Finnish lawmakers have 
traditionally been interested in other Nordic countries. In this case other Nordic 
countries took example from America. Indeed, the economic problem to which 
class actions have tailored to give an answer is not totally different in Finland 
compared to the United States.
A critical commentator must now point out how little the Finnish process relied on 
substantive and verified arguments especially when such arguments would have been 
available. Already the first government investigation from 1992 stated that empirical 
studies had proved most of the numerous claims against class actions as groundless.
43 For 
some reason, the preparation of the law continued years later if that finding would never 
had been published. In addition, the Ministry of Justice was able to construct good 
arguments to defend its draft law against industry claims in 2006. However, at that point 
their modest aim was to only defend a very limited approach to class actions. 
A cynical commentator could now conclude that  the Finnish legislative process has 
fundamental flaws  if it cannot get clear issues right. As noted, in Finland laws are 
prepared in ministries where working groups discuss the political details before a formal 
law proposal is submitted to the parliament for review. The most important part of the 
process is the composition of the working group. In the case of class actions, industry 
representatives were able to maintain a polarized situation no matter of the merits of their 
arguments. The only way to reach “a politically correct consensus” in this kind of 
situation was a substantially ill-founded compromise.
43 Wihuri (1992, p. 13).
11Interestingly, the result is  in accordance with the theory of public choice.  Industry 
representatives were able to influence the legislative process with effective coordination 
considerable more than groups with diverse interests, even though the latter groups may 
have had more to lose.
44 Some interests supporting class action were not heard in the 
process at all – it is for example difficult to name a certain group that would actively 
support constitutional rights in Finland. The state did not take a position of a referee but 
had its own interest to have at least some kind of law accepted and avoid among other 
things critique for the lack of authority.
45 
44 For example Olson (1971, pp. 141-143) why industry interests can be over-represented in the legislative 
process: there are after all not that many politically active big companies (they have same opinions) and 
they have more resources compared to other interest groups.
45 On public choice arguments for failure in legislative process see for example Mercuro and Medema 
(2006), pp. 186-195.  
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